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ABSTRACT 
 
Transactions take place everywhere, at every moment. When we think about 
transactions, we imagine the typical situation of commodity markets, where someone 
wants to obtain something from another person, and, in order to do so, a counterpart is 
given (money usually). However, transactions take place in a variety of situations where 
money cannot be used as the tool to match supply and demand, such as when assigning 
hospital beds to patients, doctors to hospitals or students to school/college places. In 
these situations, money is not used (actually, we would feel quite horrified if there were 
a situation where hospital beds were assigned to those who bet higher), so different 
mechanisms must be devised (different from the commodity markets and different from 
every one of them), so that the most efficient allocation of these very scarce resources 
could be made. That is the objective that market design theory would like to achieve.  
This paper focuses on school choice mechanisms, and carries out an econometric study 
about the specific mechanism used in Sabadell. Furthermore, it tries to explain the 
reasons that cause people to make mistakes when submitting their list of school 
preferences for their three-year-old children. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
School choice mechanism consists in the process through which every year new 
students are assigned to the available seats in the schools at their disposal. 
Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez provide this definition:  
 
In a school choice problem there are a number of students, each of whom should 
be assigned a seat at one of a number of schools. Each school has a maximum 
capacity but there is no shortage of the total seats. Each student has strict 
preferences over all schools, and each school has a strict priority ordering of all 
students. Here, priorities do not represent school preferences but they are 
imposed by state or local laws (2003: 733).  
 
This problem is very similar to the college admission problem introduced by Gale and 
Shapley (1962), which has been extensively studied, with the difference that “in school 
choice, schools are objects to be ‘consumed’ by the students, whereas in college 
admissions, schools themselves are agents who have preferences over students” 
(Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003: 733). 
To solve this problem, different mechanisms have been studied. The decision of which 
one to apply must be carefully pondered, since the implications will determine the 
specific final outcome, and therefore the environment in which the children will be 
raised. As Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez put it, “the outcome of a school choice problem 
is an assignment of schools to students such that each student is assigned one school and 
no school is assigned to more students than its capacity. We refer each such outcome as 
a matching” (2003: 733). 
However, it is not always possible to assign to all students their top choice, and for this 
reason literature tries to find the most efficient possible outcome. In this context, “[a] 
matching is Pareto efficient if there is no other matching which assigns each student a 
weakly better school and at least one student a strictly better school” (Abdulkadiroğlu 
and Sönmez, 2003: 733). 
In this paper, I explain the Boston Mechanism (which is the one used in Sabadell), 
comparing it with other mechanisms, and I analyze the data obtained, where we can see 
consistency with the previous empirical evidence. Finally, I try to rationalize people 
mistakes in a specific scenario, looking for their cause and explaining it. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
School choice has been widely studied, and different mechanisms have been proposed 
in order to be used to allocate students to school places. I will briefly explain the main 
ones. Then, I will point out the different criticisms directed to the Boston mechanism 
(BM) and why it should be changed, and under which circumstances this mechanism 
works more efficiently. 
 
2.1. School choice mechanisms 
 
2.1.1. Boston Student Assignment mechanism 
The so-called Boston mechanism has been used in the city of Boston (and some others) 
since July, 1999, and it is the one used in Sabadell too, as I will explain later. According 
to Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003), the mechanism works as follows: 
 
1. Each student submits a preference ranking of the schools.  
2. For each school a priority ordering is determined. Students in the same priority group 
are ordered based on a previously announced lottery. 
3. The final phase is the student assignment based on preferences and priorities: 
Round 1: In Round 1 only the first choices of the students are considered. For each 
school, consider only the students who have listed it as their first choice and assign 
seats to these students following their priority order until either there are no seats 
left or there is no student left who has listed it as her first choice. 
 
Round 2: Consider the remaining students. In Round 2 only the second choices of 
these students are considered. For each school with still available seats, consider 
only the students who have listed it as their second choice and assign the remaining 
seats to these students one at a time following their priority order until either there 
are no seats left or there is no student left who has listed it as her second choice. 
In general, at  
Round k: Consider the remaining students. In Round k only the kth choices of these 
students are considered. For each school with still available seats, consider the 
students who have listed it as their k
th
 choice and assign the remaining seats to these 
students one at a time following their priority order until either there are no seats left 
or there is no student left who has listed it as her k
th
 choice. 
 
The mechanism finishes when each student is assigned to a seat. 
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2.1.2. Student-Proposing Deferred Acceptance mechanism 
As aforementioned, the school choice problem is closely related to the college 
admissions problem. Thus, school priorities can be interpreted as college preferences 
and a version of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 
1962) can be applied.               
The mechanism works as follows (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003: 735):  
Step 1: Each student proposes to her first choice. Each school tentatively assigns its 
seats to its proposers one at a time following their priority order. Any remaining 
proposers are rejected.  
 
In general, at 
 
Step k: Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next choice. 
Each school considers the students it has been holding together with its new proposers 
and tentatively assigns its seats to these students one at a time following their priority 
order. Any remaining proposers are rejected. 
The process finishes when no student is rejected and each student is assigned to one 
seat. 
2.1.3. Top Trading Cycles mechanism 
The mechanism works as follows (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003: 735): 
Step 1: Assign a counter for each school which keeps track of how many seats 
are still available at the school. Initially set the counters equal to the capacities of 
the schools. Each student points to her favorite school under her announced 
preferences. Each school points to the student who has the highest priority for 
the school. Since the number of students and schools are finite, there is at least 
one cycle. (A cycle is an ordered list of distinct schools and distinct students (s
1
, 
i
1
, s
2
, ..., s
k
, i
k
) where s
1 points to i1, i1 points to s2, ..., sk points to ik, ik points to 
s
1
). Moreover, each school can be part of at most one cycle. Similarly, each 
student can be part of at most one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned a 
seat at the school she points to and is removed. The counter of each school in a 
cycle is reduced by one and if it reduces to zero, the school is also removed. 
Counters of all other schools stay put.  
In general, at  
 
Step k: Each remaining student points to her favorite school among the 
remaining schools and each remaining school points to the student with [the] 
highest priority among the remaining students. There is at least one cycle. Every 
student in a cycle is assigned a seat at the school that she points to and is 
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removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is reduced by one and if it 
reduces to zero the school is also removed. Counters of all other schools stay 
put. 
The mechanism finishes when all students are assigned to a seat in one school. 
 
2.2. Critiques to the Boston Mechanism 
BM has been widely criticized due to not being strategy-proof. This means that 
sometimes the best strategy for a student is not to reveal their real preferences, (i.e. not 
listing the schools in the order they prefer), but to strategize by making a list that 
combines their preferences for schools and their probability of being accepted in them. 
In other words: “if a student does not gain admission to his first choice school, it may be 
that his second choice is already filled to capacity with students who listed it as their 
first choice. That is, a student may fail to get a place in his second choice school that 
would have been available had he listed that school as his first choice” (Abdulkadiroğlu, 
Pathak, Roth and Sönmez, 2006: 2). 
In order to be able to maximize their probability of entering in a particular school, first 
the student must learn how the mechanism works. Pathak and Sönmez stated that 
students who have learned this are called “sophisticated students” (2008: 1639), while 
the ones that do not know it (and therefore list the schools according to their true 
preferences) are called “sincere students” (2008: 1639). “The strategy space of each 
sincere student is a singleton under the Boston game. Each sophisticated student, on the 
other hand, recognizes the strategic aspects of the student assignment process, and the 
support of her strategy space is all strict preferences over the set of schools, plus 
remaining unassigned” (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008: 1639). Therefore, sophisticated 
students are the only ones who play the game, deciding the final outcome for everyone. 
Since becoming a sophisticated student implies a cost that not everyone is capable of 
assuming, the mechanism has been accused of being unfair, and this has been the main 
reason of it being replaced in some cities. “Boston Public Schools stated that one of 
their main rationales for changing their student assignment system is that it levels the 
playing field. They identified a fairness rationale for a strategy-proof system. In this 
paper, we examined this intuitive notion and showed that the Boston mechanism favors 
sophisticated parents at Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium” (Pathak and Sönmez, 2008: 
1639). 
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2.2.1. Empirical evidence 
Thanks to a study carried out in the city of Boston, we can see that under BM, most 
students are accepted into the schools marked as first choice, so some people could state 
that the mechanism is performing adequately and therefore satisfies students and 
families. “However, given the incentives of the Boston mechanism, treating stated 
choices as true choices does not give an accurate depiction of the performance of the 
mechanism. It would be a mistake, for instance, to conclude that 80% of students in 
Boston are satisfied with their assignment based on numbers that might not reflect the 
true preferences” (Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006: 13). 
This happens because a majority of students decides to apply for their guaranteed 
option, i.e. the school they have already a seat in, as their first choice. “At the 
elementary school level, about 16% of students are assigned to their guaranteed choice. 
This fraction increases to 29% and 52% at the middle and high school level” 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006: 13). 
Under BM, it makes no sense to rank an over-demanded school as their second choice 
or lower (“[f]or a given year, define a school to be [over-demanded] if the number of 
students who rank that school as their first choice is greater than the number of seats at 
the school”) (Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006: 14). Evidence shows that students understand 
this issue, with only a few of them ranking over-demanded schools as their second or 
third choice. Abdulkadiroğlu et al (2006) conclude that, in elementary school, only a 
36% of them rank an over-demanded school as their second choice, and only a 28% as 
their third choice.  
This percentage of people could be understood as the ones who are being “sincere 
students” and, therefore, revealing their true preferences and not strategizing the game. 
These students are the ones who will be greatly benefited from changing the mechanism 
used to one that was strategy-proof. 
 
2.3. Support to the Boston Mechanism 
Criticisms against BM are based on its lack of efficiency and fairness, and that is the 
reason why the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) has been suggested to substitute 
it. However, the analysis in which DA shows better properties than BM is based on a 
very strong assumption: schools have strict priorities over students, and thus there is no 
uncertainty about the final outcome (there are no ties that must be broken randomly). 
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In reality, schools do not have strict priorities but “weak priorities” (Miralles, 2008: 3). 
There are only a few categories, and consequently this fact produces several ties that 
must be broken randomly, rendering the assumption of full information (on which the 
efficiency of DA is based) impossible. According to Abdulkadiroğlu, Che and Yasuda, 
“[t]his makes the assumption of full information particularly problematic. Not only is it 
unlikely for students to know others' preferences, but it is simply impossible for them to 
know others' - even their own - priorities at schools if they are chosen randomly after 
students submit their rankings” (2009: 3). 
Moreover, taking into account that schools present weak priorities and students have 
similar ordinal preferences (since families value schools based on similar qualities, such 
as reputation or the neighborhood they are in), concepts such as Pareto efficiency lose 
relevance. As Miralles put it: “DA performs very poorly if students’ ordinal preferences 
are perfectly correlated. Precisely because DA is strategy-proof, it cannot make any 
distinction among students if all of them share identical ordinal preferences” (2008: 4). 
While DA resolves ties using random lotteries, without taking into account their 
“cardinal preferences” (Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2009; Miralles, 2008), i.e., the intensity 
with which every student prefers each school to the others, BM makes its strategizing 
component useful to solve ties efficiently. We can see a very useful example to 
understand this in Abdulkadiroğlu et al (2009: 5). Hence, obtaining strategy-proofness 
involves a loss in the total welfare, and the other way around, making it difficult to 
choose between either mechanism. 
As far as fairness is concerned, naïve students benefit from BM in the sense that they 
have more possibilities to enter top-popular schools, since sophisticated students will 
not rank them in their lists. Furthermore, to help the most disadvantaged and not lose 
BM’s efficiency, a correction could be made: “[c]orrected reported rankings would 
remove schools with no remaining slots to last positions. When all students are 
sophisticated, this correction is innocuous. Simulations show that this device works fine 
for naïve students while largely preserving overall efficiency” (Miralles, 2008: 5). 
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3. THE DATA  
3.1. Data analysis 
In order to construct the model, I have used data provided by the “Departament 
d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya”, concerning the admission process for 
seats in P3 (first year of elementary school for 3-year-old children) for the academic 
year 2016-2017 in the schools of Sabadell. In this data, we can observe the list of school 
preferences that parents have submitted, as well as their final allocation, the school 
priorities related to every student, and the offer and demand for every school for the last 
3 years. 
With this data, I was able to detect different mistakes which people committed when 
submitting their list of preferences: 
- Mistake 1: when people rank an over-demanded school (i.e. a school that had 
more applications than available seats in the k
th 
round) as their k
th
+n choice. To 
detect this mistake, first I created a table with schools and rounds in order to 
check in which round the available seats in the school were 0 (i.e. in which 
round the school became over-demanded); afterwards, I created an algorithm 
(which was replicated) that showed which parents had committed this mistake. 
This is the mistake committed by most parents. 
 
- Mistake 2: when people list very few schools, taking great risk unnecessarily. 
The detection of this mistake has been difficult, in the sense that people who 
committed this mistake could obtain two different outcomes: 
o They could obtain a seat in one of the schools ranked, so no observable 
mistake would be detected. 
o They could not get any seat in any of the schools listed, which entails 
that they are assigned in one of the schools with available seats when the 
rest of students have been allocated. This was easy to detect with the data 
available, and, thus, this outcome has been the one taken into account. 
 
- Mistake 3: when people list a school in which they have less priority than they 
need to enter. This mistake also has a strategic component, since, after the main 
process, they are put into the waiting list and the claiming process begins, in 
which some irregularities can be detected, whereby the people in the waiting list 
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could be assigned a seat. Two cases were observed in which someone obtained a 
seat with less priority that someone who did not get it. For this reason, these two 
cases were not considered, as it is not clear if it could be marked as a mistake or 
not. 
- General Mistake: when parents have committed any or several of the 
aforementioned mistakes. 
As mentioned before, the main mistake committed by parents is the mistake 1, although 
it has consequences (i.e. people could have obtained a better seat if they had not 
committed this mistake) in very few cases. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate some information 
about the data. 
 
Table 1: Number of people who committed the mistake 
 
 
Sample size: n=1923 
People who committed 
the mistake 
People who were affected 
by the mistake 
Mistake 1 664 52 
Percentage 34.45 2.70 
Percentage conditional to 
mistake 
 7.83 
Mistake 2 58 58 
Percentage 3.01 3.01 
Percentage conditional to 
mistake 
 100 
Mistake 3 11 9 
Percentage 0.57 0.47 
Percentage conditional to 
mistake 
 81.82 
General Mistake 688 80 
Percentage 35.74 4.16 
Percentage conditional to 
mistake 
 11.63 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament”. 
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Table 2: Number of people who entered each option 
 
Sample size: n=1923 Number of people who entered in every option %  
1
st 
Option 1803 93.76 
2
nd
 Option 36 1.87 
3
rd
 Option 14 0.73 
4
th
 Option 9 0.47 
5
th 
Option 2 0.1 
6
th
 Option 1 0.05 
Assigned to default option 58 3.02 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament”. 
 
Similarities can be observed with regard to the results published in previous empirical 
studies (Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006), in which the number of people who ranked an 
over-demanded school was 36%, similar to the 34.45% found in this study. In the same 
sense, it could be understood that the majority of families are satisfied with the outcome 
of the mechanism, since almost 94% of students are admitted into their top choice 
(however, taking into account how the mechanism works, it cannot be concluded that 
their top choice is their most preferred one). 
 
3.2. The Boston mechanism in Sabadell 
In Sabadell, students are assigned seats at public schools through a centralized student 
assignment mechanism, very similar to the so-called Boston mechanism. In the spring 
of each school year, the following groups of students (or their families) are required to 
submit a preference ranking of schools: 
 
- Students who seek a spot in 1st year of primary school (students who turn 6 years 
old during that scholar year). 
- Students who seek a spot in 1st year of high school (students who turn 12 years 
old during that scholar year). 
A preference ranking of schools may also be submitted by: 
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- Students who seek a spot in the 1st year of elementary school (students who turn 
3 years old during that scholar year). 
- Students who seek a spot in kindergarten. 
Students in the remaining non-transition courses are not required to submit a list of 
schools unless they request a transfer. 
In Sabadell, students are allowed to rank a maximum of 10 schools. Taking into account 
the preference that the mechanism gives to first choices, it makes sense that only 1.2% 
of students listed up to 10 schools (and none of them were given their 10
th
 option). 
For the 1
st
 year of elementary school (which has been the one studied in this paper), 
students are assigned a random number, which will be used to break ties. When the 
number of applications is greater than the number of seats in the school, students are 
ordered on the basis of how many points are collected (this procedure is related to the 
first school listed, and is kept for the rest of schools). Points are earned as follows
1
: 
- General criteria: 
o When the student has a sibling studying in the same school, or a parent 
works in that school: 40 points. 
o When the address is near the school, or the place where the 
father/mother/legal tutor works is near the school: 
 If the address is in the influence area of the school: 30 points. 
 If the place where the father/mother/legal tutor works is near the 
influence area of the school: 20 points. 
 If the address is in the same town but not in the area of influence 
of the school: 10 points. 
o When parents or tutors receive an economic help (renda mínima 
d’inserció): 10 points. 
o When the student, their parents or their siblings have a disability ≥ 33%: 
10 points. 
- Complementary criteria: This criteria are taken into account when there are ties 
in the general criteria. 
o Large family or single parent family: 15 points. 
o The student suffers from a chronic disease which affects their digestive, 
endocrine or metabolic systems: 10 points. 
                                                 
1Source: “Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament d’Ensenyament.” 
http://queestudiar.gencat.cat/ca/preinscripcio/estudis/obligatoris/documentacio/index.html 
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o The father, mother, siblings or tutors have studied in the school: 5 
points. 
- When there are ties after the complementary criteria have been applied, a 
random lottery number is used to break it. 
After the process has finished, the claiming process begins, and minor adjustments may 
be made. This process is conducted personally for parents who request it, and thus it is 
not realized through a centralized mechanism. 
 
3.3. The model 
With the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de 
Catalunya”, different variables to explain the mistakes committed by families when 
submitting their preferences lists were created. To create the variable “Wealth”, 
additional data provided by the “Secció del Cadastre de l’Ajuntament de Sabadell” was 
used. The variables are detailed as follows: 
 
- Dist_worst2: distance from the address to the worst-case scenario (i.e. the school 
listed by the student as their last option), in minutes. This is used as a proxy of 
how fond the parents are of the school. The closer to the school, the more they 
like it. The square of this variable is also included in the model. 
- Wealth: average price in €/m2 of the cadastral island where the address is 
located. This is used as a proxy of the family sophistication, how much 
resources they have to learn correctly how to strategize. 
- Pop1415_1: average popularity between the years 2014-2015 for the school 
listed as their first choice.  
- Pop1415_worst: average popularity between the years 2014-2015 for the school 
listed as their worst-case scenario. 
- Points: total points earned by the student in the general criteria. The square of 
this variable is also included in the model. 
 
 
                                                 
2 We assume that the worst-case scenario for student i is the school listed as their last option, because we imagine that 
the student knows in some way that their last listed option is the worst that could happen to them if they were to be 
unlucky. 
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3.3.1. Main statistics 
Table 3: Main statistics 
 
Main statistics, using observations 1 - 1923 
(absent values were not taken into account) 
Variables Average Standard deviation 
Dist_worst 18,4 41,7 
Wealth 517, 96,7 
Pop1415_worst -0,0475 0,226 
Points -0,0863 0,396 
sq_Points 0,165 0,225 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament” and “Secció del Cadastre”. 
 
 
3.3.2. Probit 
In order to study the data, a Probit model was used. However, some problems arose.  
First of all, I have no access to all the data for the variable “wealth”. Most of the sample 
analyzed comprised people living in the city of Sabadell. As mentioned before, to create 
the variable “wealth” for these people, data provided by the government was utilized. 
For people living in other cities, 3 different groups have been made: 
1. For people living in the city of Barcelona, data related to the average cadastral 
price of the neighborhood was found in the webpage of the city hall. 
2. For people living in cities similar to Sabadell, an approximation was created by 
using the available public data. 
3. For people living in other cities/towns, no data was available. Therefore, these 
observations were lost. 
Secondly, the variables Pop that I used to measure the quality of the schools were also 
an indicator of how difficult it is to be accepted into them. Thus, the possibility of 
making a mistake is greater when the school is a very popular one (Pop is bigger), but 
also decreases if the quality of your worst-case scenario is greater (Pop is bigger). I have 
no access to better indicators for the quality of schools (such as Pisa results by schools); 
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thus, I utilized a Pobit model with Instrumental Variables
3
 by using the variable 
Pop1415_1 as an instrument for Pop1415_worst, which was the best indicator I could 
obtain. This variable is not the best indicator for the quality of schools, so further 
improvements of the model need to be made. 
Lastly, since half of the people only listed one school, the variables “Pop1415_1” and 
“Pop1415_worst” are strongly correlated (in fact, they are the same for half of the 
sample). However, I deem the other half to be important, since it consists of completely 
different options which are significant variables which need to be taken into account. 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
 
Correlation coefficients, using observations 1 - 1923 
(absent values were not taken into account) 
 
Critical value at 5% (two tails) = 0.0447 for n = 1923 
 
Pop1415_wo
rst 
Pop1415_1  
1.0000 0.5558 Pop1415_wo
rst 
 1.0000 Pop1415_1 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament”. 
 
 
With the Probit model with instrumental variables, I try to determine the reasons that 
caused people to rank over-demanded schools. 
Several attempts have been made before finding the final outcome, provided as follows. 
This outcome is thought to be more accurate. However, I hope to make further 
improvements in the future, as more information becomes available and I develop new 
ideas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 See the Appendix for more information. 
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3.3.3. Results 
Table 4: Probit model with endogenous regressors 
 
Probit model with endogenous regressors 
ML, using observations 1-1884 
Dependent Variable: GeneralMistake  
Instrumented: Pop1415_worst 
Instruments: const, Dist_worst, sq_Dist_worst, Wealth, Points, sq_Points, Pop1415_1  
Parameter covariance matrix: OPG 
 
                  Coeficiente    Desv. Típica      z      valor p 
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const           -0.306395      0.167875       -1.825    0.0680  * 
  Dist_worst      -0.00156112    0.00215299     -0.7251   0.4684  
  sq_Dist_worst    2.46121e-06   8.84631e-06     0.2782   0.7808  
  Wealth          -4.72352e-05   0.000305820    -0.1545   0.8773  
  Points          -0.616842      0.199432       -3.093    0.0020  *** 
  sq_Points        0.309088      0.153214        2.017    0.0437  ** 
  Pop1415_worst    1.82284       0.581883        3.133    0.0017  *** 
 
Log-likelihood        -659.1800  Akaike criterion    1350.3599 
Schwarz criterion     1439.0184  Hannan-Quinn        1383.0119 
Conditional ll     -1217.819610  Cragg-Donald stat.    101.392 
 
Overall test (Wald) = 17.1268 (6 df, p-value = 0.0088) 
Endogeneity test (Wald) = 14.8633 (1 df, p-value = 0.0001) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament” and “Secció del Cadastre”. 
 
In analyzing the results, we can discard the null hypothesis that people’s mistakes are 
not affected by the independent variables proposed (overall test Wald), and we can 
observe which variables affect the possibilities of committing a mistake. 
Surprisingly, with the results found, it would seem that the wealth of the family (as 
proxy of the family’s sophistication) and the distance to the school (as proxy of how 
much they like the school) do not affect how well students “play” the matching game. 
These variables were included in the model because they were expected to be 
significant, as other studies have proposed (Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006). However, with 
the data available and the model constructed, they do not affect the mistakes committed 
by students. 
The results show that the priority which students have in their top choice affects 
positively their possibilities of committing a mistake. In other words, the more points 
they have, the more likely it is for them to commit the mistake. This makes sense, since 
reflecting upon the strategy to play well has a cost, and paying this cost is not needed if 
the student has a very high priority in their top choice.  
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The negative sign in the square points variable indicates that this effect diminishes as 
the student obtains more points (if they acquire enough points to know it is almost sure 
they will obtain their top choice, it is not very important if they have even more than 
that).  
The positive sign in the Pop1415_worst variable indicates that the more popular (better 
quality) the worst school in which the student can obtain a seat is, the more likely it is to 
commit the mistake. This makes sense too, since if the worst that could happen if they 
commit the mistake is to go to a good school, it is preferred to commit the mistake than 
to pay the cost of strategizing. 
 
A second model using Pop1415_1 as an exogenous variable and CAEP_worst as an 
instrument for Pop1415_worst was constructed, with very similar results. In that model, 
Pop1415_1 is shown as not significant. 
 
A third model was constructed, with another specification of the distance variables, by 
using the following dummies, as in Calsamiglia, Fu and Güell (2016). 
- Dist_worse>5: dummy variable: it takes value 1 if the distance from the address 
to the worst-case scenario is greater than 5 minutes. 
- Dist_worse>10: dummy variable: it takes value 1 if the distance from the 
address to the worst-case scenario is greater than 10 minutes. 
With this model, we found all the distance variables not to be significant, possibly 
because of the interaction between the variables. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
With the information provided by the model constructed, we can obtain some ideas, 
even though these ideas could be developed in the future, and new and better variables 
could be added to the model.  
Students will obtain a determined level of utility, depending on the school in which they 
obtain a seat. This level of utility will be the highest possible if they obtain a seat in 
their top choice school, the lowest if they obtain a seat in their last choice school (since 
we assume students understand that the worst that could happen to them if they commit 
the mistake is going to their last listed school), and every level in-between. 
When the lowest level of utility that could be attained increases, so does the probability 
of committing a mistake, because the potential utility gain is reduced, and, therefore, 
thinking of a better strategy which prevented the mistake from being committed (and 
increasing the probability of obtaining the maximum utility level) would not be cost-
effective. It is for this reason that, if the quality of the worst-case scenario school 
increases, so does the probability of committing the mistake. This idea is consistent with 
what was found in the model. 
On the other hand, if the distance to the worst-case scenario school increases (i.e. the 
school is less desirable), the probability of committing the mistake decreases. 
However, the distance to the school was not significant at all in the model, in 
contradiction with the anecdotal evidence that other papers may suggest 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006). 
Furthermore, we included some control variables that measured the cost of strategizing 
(submitting the best possible list) for each student (inversely related to the 
sophistication of the student). The more sophisticated the student is, the more incentives 
they have in order to submit the best possible list, and hence the probability of 
committing a mistake is reduced. 
The sophistication of the student was measured by using an indicator of the family 
wealth, and in the model constructed it did not affect the probability of committing the 
mistake, unlike may be suggested by the anecdotal evidence present in other studies 
(Abdulkadiroğlu et al, 2006). This could happen because the measure of wealth utilized 
is not a proper measure of the sophistication needed for this “game”. 
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Finally, the points measure the uncertainty of the utility obtained playing a particular 
strategy. When the points increase, the information needed to know whether the student 
will enter in their top choice is reduced, and hence the probability of entering the top 
choice increases (the risk of not entering the top choice diminishes). Moreover, in the 
limit, once a certain number of points has been achieved, it may be established that the 
student will not make it to the second round. Thus, it does not matter what schools the 
student list as their (1+n)
th
 choice (if these schools are over-demanded or not), 
increasing the probability of committing the mistake. This idea is also consistent with 
the results found in the model, where the square points variable was added too, and 
through this variable it is shown that the effect of the points in the probability of 
committing a mistake is smooth: when the points increase, the probability of 
committing the mistake increases, but the increase is smaller as points reach a high 
level). 
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Appendix 
Endogenous Variable 
When constructing the model, an endogeneity problem with the Pop1415_worst 
variable was found. That is the reason why a Probit model with instrumental variables 
was used. When constructing a Probit binary model, the signs of the variables’ 
coefficient were not the expected (and not significant). The model without instrumental 
variables is provided as follows: 
 
Table 5: Binary Probit model 
 
 
Modelo 1: Probit, usando las observaciones 1-1923 (n = 1886) 
Se han eliminado las observaciones ausentes o incompletas: 37 
Variable dependiente: GeneralMistake 
Desviaciones típicas basadas en el Hessiano 
 
  Coeficiente Desv. Típica z Pendiente
*
 
const -0.400328 0.165623 -2.4171 
Dist_worst -0.00174258 0.00149829 -1.1630 -0.0006504 
sq_Dist_worst 2.8157e-06 2.27331e-06 1.2386 1.05093e-06 
Wealth 2.41435e-05 0.000310377 0.0778 9.01132e-06 
Points 0.0350159 0.103616 0.3379 0.0130693 
sq_Points 0.222274 0.15721 1.4139 0.0829617 
Pop1415_worst -0.299195 0.159604 -1.8746 -0.111672 
 
Media de la vble. dep.  0.357900  D.T. de la vble. dep.  0.479510 
R-cuadrado de 
McFadden 
 0.004678  R-cuadrado corregido -0.001013 
Log-verosimilitud -1224.296  Criterio de Akaike  2462.592 
Criterio de Schwarz  2501.387  Crit. de Hannan-Quinn  2476.879 
 
 
*
Evaluado en la media 
Número de casos 'correctamente predichos' = 1217 (64.5%) 
f(beta'x) en la media de las variables independientes = 0.480 
Contraste de razón de verosimilitudes: Chi-cuadrado(6) = 11.5086 [0.0739] 
Contraste de normalidad de los residuos - 
 Hipótesis nula: el error se distribuye normalmente 
 Estadístico de contraste: Chi-cuadrado(2) = 16.0198 
 con valor p  = 0.000332155 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament” and “Secció del Cadastre”. 
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The complete model of the Probit model with Instrumental Variables (including the 
first-stage regressions) is provided as follows: 
 
Table: 6-Complete Probit model with endogenous regressors 
 
Probit model with endogenous regressors 
ML, using observations 1-1884 
Dependent Variable: GeneralMistake  
Instrumented: Pop1415_worst 
Instruments: const, Dist_worst, sq_Dist_worst, Wealth, Points, sq_Points, Pop1415_1  
Parameter covariance matrix: OPG 
 
                  Coeficiente    Desv. Típica      z      valor p 
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const           -0.306395      0.167875       -1.825    0.0680  * 
  Dist_worst      -0.00156112    0.00215299     -0.7251   0.4684  
  sq_Dist_worst    2.46121e-06   8.84631e-06     0.2782   0.7808  
  Wealth          -4.72352e-05   0.000305820    -0.1545   0.8773  
  Points          -0.616842      0.199432       -3.093    0.0020  *** 
  sq_Points        0.309088      0.153214        2.017    0.0437  ** 
  Pop1415_worst    1.82284       0.581883        3.133    0.0017  *** 
 
"First-stage" regressions 
 
                 Coeficiente   Desv. Típica     z       valor p  
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const          -0.00328193   0.0264542     -0.1241   0.9013    
  Dist_worst     -0.000108744  0.000371095   -0.2930   0.7695    
  sq_Dist_worst   1.30321e-07  2.83160e-06    0.04602  0.9633    
  Wealth         -9.95159e-06  4.81792e-05   -0.2066   0.8364    
  Points          0.167339     0.0169574      9.868    5.72e-023 *** 
  sq_Points      -0.0911429    0.0187148     -4.870    1.12e-06  *** 
  Pop1415_1       0.302399     0.0236832     12.77     2.46e-037 *** 
 
Log-likelihood        -659.1800  Akaike criterion    1350.3599 
Schwarz criterion     1439.0184  Hannan-Quinn        1383.0119 
Conditional ll     -1217.819610  Cragg-Donald stat.    101.392 
 
Overall test (Wald) = 17.1268 (6 df, p-value = 0.0088) 
Endogeneity test (Wald) = 14.8633 (1 df, p-value = 0.0001) 
 
Source: Own elaboration from the data provided by the “Departament d’Ensenyament” and “Secció del Cadastre.” 
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School seat application form which parents must fill out 
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Source: “Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament d’Ensenyament.” 
http://educacio.gencat.cat/documents/FormularisModels/CentresGestioAdministrativa/A42.pdf 
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Map detailing the location of preschool and primary education institutions in 
Sabadell 
Source: “Ajuntament de Sabadell.” 
